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ABSTRACT
The common understanding of the First Amendment is that its
purpose is primarily libertarian, serving to protect private citizens’
expression from government censorship. In the modern era, however,
the government’s pervasive presence—especially in the role of funder
of private activity—has blurred the lines between governmental and
private speech. Further, the relatively new, increasingly influential
government speech doctrine—which dictates that the government will
not be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny when it is engaging in
communication—has been the Supreme Court’s guidepost of late
when the Court has been confronted with a case involving expression
with both private and public elements.
The government speech doctrine as currently applied by the Court
is a relatively blunt instrument, one which does not distinguish
between different levels of government or the varied purposes of
government activity. The overwhelming weight of First Amendment
doctrine, however, suggests that the application of the Free Speech
Clause should be case-specific, with each type of government
regulation receiving a level of scrutiny appropriately tailored to the
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specific type of speech with which it deals and the context in which
that speech operates. This Note argues that the Court should adopt a
similarly contextual approach when choosing how and whether to
apply the government speech doctrine. Specifically, it posits that when
a government organization is charged with a task that heavily
implicates the First Amendment rights of private parties—such as arts
funding—and Congress has purposefully given it a measure of
independence to allow it to fulfill that role in a neutral manner, the
Court should afford that organization’s selection activities protection
under the Free Speech Clause, rather than treating them as
government speech. This approach would allow independent
organizations responsible for promoting activities clearly protected by
the First Amendment—like creative writing, journalism, and the
visual arts—to defend their merit-based selection decisions against
partisan political influence, instead of conflating the two levels of
decisionmaking into one broad category of government speech.
Though this approach ostensibly goes against the libertarian aims of
the First Amendment, this Note seeks to demonstrate that giving
independent-minded government organizations free speech rights on
an institutional basis actually comports more closely with the theory,
history, and doctrine of the First Amendment than does the current
government speech doctrine.

INTRODUCTION
According to Judge Learned Hand, the rationale underlying the
Free Speech Clause is “that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
1
authoritative selection.” Though this statement accurately explains
one of the primary theoretical underpinnings of First Amendment
doctrine, modern society has developed in such a way—particularly
with the expansion of the federal government and the rise of the
administrative state—that “authoritative selection” at the hands of
government officials plays a large role in determining which concepts
2
will feature prominently in the metaphorical marketplace of ideas.
The state’s right to select certain ideas over others is uncontroversial
when political actors exercise the right openly in the pursuit of policy

1. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326 U.S.
1 (1945).
2. For an explanation of the marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment, see
infra Part I.A.
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goals, thereby furthering the project of governance. The need for
limitations on the government’s ability to place speech-related
restrictions on the vast universe of private persons and institutions
entitled to government aid is also an unremarkable concept, given
that the First Amendment’s limitation on laws abridging speech
would be rendered virtually meaningless if Congress were permitted
to condition federal funding on a recipient’s agreement to refrain
4
from speech. The government’s promotion of certain ideas or
messages over others becomes much more controversial, however,
when the expression inextricably involves both governmental and
5
private actors. Thus, government-created advertisements subsidized
6
by private funds, state license plates featuring the logos of
7
nongovernmental organizations, and monuments donated by private
8
groups to be placed in public parks have all been the subject of
3. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (“A government
entity has the right to speak for itself.” (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550,
553 (2005) (“[T]he government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”);
see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“To govern, government has to say
something . . . .”). In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Court provided an
uncontroversial example of this concept in its seminal government speech decision. See id. at
194 (“When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other
countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a program
to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” (citation
omitted)).
4. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 7:5
(2010) (“Government is now so large, and governmental affiliation so ubiquitous, that freedom
of speech would be rendered an empty guarantee if government retained carte blanche to attach
any restrictions on speech that it pleased based on the receipt of governmental benefits.”).
5. For an argument that this type of hybrid speech should be treated as a category distinct
from both purely public and purely private expression, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed
Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008).
6. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562–67 (holding that using funds from an assessment on beef
producers to pay for generic, government-created advertising credited to “America’s Beef
Producers”—advertising that many of the beef producers did not approve of—did not compel
speech in violation of the First Amendment).
7. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867, 870 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that
Missouri’s specialty license plate program communicated private speech and thus was required
to issue plates promoting a “Choose Life” message to avoid pernicious viewpoint
discrimination); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 857–67 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding
that Illinois’s decision to exclude all abortion-related content from its specialty license plate
program was a permissible form of content discrimination and vacating the district court’s
requirement that the state issue “Choose Life” plates). For an explanation of the multi-circuit
split resulting from the specialty license plate controversy, see Developments in the Law—State
Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1296–98 (2010).
8. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129, 1138 (holding that Pleasant Grove City, Utah had the
right under the government speech doctrine to refuse to place a monument donated by the
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recent First Amendment challenges. The question of the First
Amendment status of mixed governmental-private speech has farranging implications, but few are so close to the core concerns of the
Free Speech Clause as when the government funds activities that
derive much of their worth from their independent status. These
activities and institutions include public broadcasting, libraries,
museums, and artistic creation—representing, respectively, the
government’s roles as journalist, librarian, curator, and patron of the
9
arts. As then-Solicitor General Seth Waxman acknowledged during
argument before the Supreme Court, “[T]here is something
unique . . . about the Government funding of the arts for First
10
Amendment purposes.”
Despite the complicated attribution questions arising from the
increasing scope of speech that combines governmental and private
expression, the Supreme Court has become increasingly dogmatic in
its insistence that “the Free Speech Clause has no application” when
11
the government is “engaging in [its] own expressive conduct.”
Difficulty arises, however, due to the increasing blurriness of the line
between the government’s own speech and a private entity’s speech in
situations that involve both. In situations when a government agency
chooses among the works of private actors to determine whom to
fund, for example, can these funding choices fairly be characterized as
a “message” the government is communicating? And who is “the
government” in this context—the broader federal government or the
individual agency? Though the scope of the speech that could
potentially remain exempt from First Amendment scrutiny under the
so-called government speech doctrine is vast, the Court’s
jurisprudence points toward a tendency to treat “government” as a
monolithic creature, rather than recognizing the nuances involved in
12
intragovernmental interactions.
church of Summum in a public park, even though it had previously accepted both religious and
secular monuments donated by a number of other groups).
9. See generally Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998) (discussing the different roles the government plays
depending upon the norms of the institution with which it is interacting).
10. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569 (1998) (No. 97-371).
11. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. The concept of “expressive conduct” is further explained
in Part I, infra.
12. In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009), for example, the
Court refused to accept the theory that a state law prohibiting payroll deductions from funding
political activities abridged the free speech rights of local government entities that wished to
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This Note challenges the Court’s expanding conception of what
constitutes government speech by arguing that First Amendment
theory, doctrine, and history support the idea that certain government
entities can be treated like independent First Amendment
rightsholders instead of being understood to communicate a
government message. Because the theory behind the government
speech doctrine centers upon the need to implement policy
13
decisions, which concededly could not happen were the government
not able to express policy preferences, certain government-created
organizations that were never intended to convey the messages of the
party in power do not fit neatly within the doctrine’s purview. Even in
its previous First Amendment decisions, the Court has treated
government organizations that interact with private actors in a way
that particularly impacts free speech concerns—like public
14
broadcasters and universities—differently. This Note argues that, to
support the goals underlying the Free Speech Clause, courts should
recognize that government entities that are intended to exercise
apolitical, independent judgment about subjects with which the First
Amendment is particularly concerned—like education, literature, the
arts, and journalism—have inherent free speech rights. In other
words, these organizations should be treated as offering their own
protected expression, rather than as presenting a government
viewpoint, which would necessarily be that of the political branches.
This Note’s argument squarely contradicts the majority view that
15
the government, at any level, cannot assert free speech rights.
remit their employees’ payroll deductions to union political action committees. Id. at 1100–01.
These nuances implicate questions of federalism, as indicated in Ysursa, as well as separationof-powers concerns, especially regarding executive and legislative control over independent
agencies and corporations.
13. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (“If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no
one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great
concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of
government as we know it radically transformed.” (quoting Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12–
13 (1990))); Finley, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is the very
business of government to favor and disfavor points of view . . . .”).
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 3:13 (stating that black-letter law recognizes that
“[t]he Free Speech Clause does not instill in governmental units themselves any free speech
rights”). But see generally David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 1637 (2006) (arguing that government speech should be protected by the First
Amendment when “the expressive conduct at issue is constitutive of the public function of the
entity speaking, so that restricting expression would rob the speaker of a core purpose for which
it was created”); Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free
Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999)
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Though arguing against conventional wisdom, it seeks to show that
theory, doctrine, and history support the possibility of governmental
First Amendment rights. Further, it aims to present an alternative to
the Court’s broad-sweeping conception of government speech, which
is in danger of encompassing more speech than it must to support the
goal of policy implementation.
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I offers an overview of
First Amendment theory and doctrine, demonstrating the underlying
goals achieved by protecting free speech. Part II discusses the
government speech doctrine and explains the problems stemming
from its broadening reach. Part III delves more deeply into the
unique characteristics of the government organizations upon which
this Note proposes conferring First Amendment rights. These
characteristics include their independence from direct political
oversight, their advancement of core First Amendment goals, and
their purpose of engaging in speechlike activity—which necessarily
involves expression of private parties that is unquestionably protected
by the Free Speech Clause. Finally, Part IV closes with a proposal for
how courts could implement this idea. The proposed analysis would
mirror the Court’s previous treatment of broadcast organizations,
applying a level of intermediate scrutiny. If the agency were engaged
in speech and the broader federal government were seeking to
infringe upon its set procedures for decisionmaking, then courts
should balance the government’s legitimate interests in regulation
against the value derived from the agency’s independence, thereby
shielding the agency from inappropriate politicization. This Note
argues that the proposed approach better supports the greater goals
underlying the First Amendment.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND DOCTRINE
A. Three Theoretical Rationales Underlying Protection of Freedom
of Speech
One central issue to address about this Note’s proposed
protection of a government entity’s right to free speech is whether
such protection comports with the general purpose of the First
Amendment. No definitive answer exists as to why the Framers
(pointing out that the First Amendment was originally understood to support the goals of
federalism and positing that state governments should be able to sue the federal government for
violations of their free speech rights).
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included speech as one of the core values enunciated in the Bill of
Rights, but three theories have gained wide acceptance as jointly
explaining why this nation values freedom of expression: the
marketplace of ideas theory, the self-fulfillment theory, and the
16
democratic self-governance theory.
1. The Marketplace of Ideas Theory. The marketplace of ideas
theory is one of the most widely accepted explanations for the
Constitution’s protection of speech. The theory “assumes that a
process of robust debate, if uninhibited by governmental interference,
will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best perspectives or
17
solutions for societal problems.” Its roots are generally recognized in
18
the writings of John Milton and John Stuart Mill, and its
establishment as the dominant theory of the First Amendment has
19
been traced to Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
20
Constitution.

This idea that the Free Speech Clause promotes free competition
among ideas has informed Supreme Court jurisprudence since the
time of Justice Holmes, and it continues to perform an important
21
function in guiding the Court’s First Amendment opinions.

16. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:3 (explaining that “marketplace of ideas,” “human
dignity and self-fulfillment,” and “democratic self-governance” are the “[t]hree classic free
speech theories”).
17. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3.
18. See id. (“[T]his classic image of competing ideas and robust debate dates back to
English philosophers John Milton and John Stuart Mill . . . .”); see also SMOLLA, supra note 4,
§ 2:15 (“The marketplace of ideas justification for freedom of speech is grounded in the
tradition of Milton and Mill.”).
19. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
20. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“The
Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and moral
judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed.”).
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2. The Self-Fulfillment Theory. Unlike the marketplace theory,
which supposes that the Free Speech Clause primarily serves to
protect the search for truth via group debate, the self-fulfillment
theory of the First Amendment conceptualizes the provision’s goal as
guarding individual expression, regardless of its value, truth, or
22
acceptance. This theory is grounded in the idea that “freedom to
speak without restraint provides the speaker with an inner
satisfaction and realization of self-identity essential to individual
23
fulfillment.” Under this theory, protection of freedom of expression
24
logically flows from the inherent right to freedom of thought. Courts
have drawn a distinction between the absolute protection of thought
and the more circumscribed First Amendment protection of
25
expression, which does not reach nonexpressive actions. Though its
scope is necessarily limited, however, the idea that speech should be
protected because individual free expression has inherent value also
guides much Supreme Court jurisprudence in the First Amendment
26
realm.
3. The Democratic Self-Governance Theory. The final commonly
accepted theory underlying constitutional protection of speech states
that free expression must be protected to allow democratic
27
government to function. Unlike the marketplace theory, the
democratic self-governance theory supports the idea that “freedom of
speech . . . should cover only speech that is related to self28
governance.” This concept, devised and championed by philosopher

22. See SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:21 (“[F]ree speech is also an end itself, an end intimately
intertwined with human autonomy and dignity.”).
23. Id.
24. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The right to think is the
beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the
beginning of thought.”).
25. See SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:25 (quoting Doe v. City of Lafayette, 334 F.3d 606, 610
(7th Cir. 2003), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also id. (“A persuasive
case can be made that speech is different in kind from most other forms of self-gratification, and
is therefore deserving of special solicitude.”). Nonexpressive action refers to conduct that,
because it lacks an expressive element, is unprotected by the Free Speech Clause.
26. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human
spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.”).
27. See SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:27 (“The relationship of free speech to democracy is well
entrenched in the American constitutional tradition.”).
28. Id. § 2:28 (emphasis omitted).
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29

and free speech advocate Alexander Meiklejohn, envisions that the
Free Speech Clause was intended not to create “a dialectical free-forall or a truth-seeking process,” but rather to support the “business of
30
self-governance.” Though it would be difficult to make an argument
at this point in the Court’s jurisprudence that First Amendment
protection is limited to political speech, the self-governance theory is
still influential, and political speech is considered to be at the core of
31
the First Amendment’s protections.
As this Note argues in Part IV, affording First Amendment rights
to a limited number of government institutions does not conflict with
any of these foundational First Amendment theories. In fact, it would
support these free speech goals to a greater extent than does the
status quo.
B. First Amendment Doctrine and the Problem of Governmental
Selection of Nongovernmental Speech
In addition to theory, one must also grasp the current state of
Supreme Court doctrine to understand why government agencies
might require free speech protection. Though the aforementioned
foundational theories apply most naturally to individuals or
independent groups, the growth of the state and its foray into
educational and cultural affairs have resulted in situations in which
individuals cannot feasibly defend their free speech rights. The
following three examples of this phenomenon are typical of cases
involving governmental selection of nongovernmental speech. They
each involve a government entity that must make selections among
the speech of private speakers due to scarcity of resources, when the
government’s promotion of a certain private speaker’s message is a
privilege, rather than a widely available right. As these cases
demonstrate, scarcity of resources and the right-privilege distinction
make it difficult for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights under a First
Amendment theory, resulting in a series of Supreme Court decisions
maximizing governmental discretion in institutions charged with

29. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948) (positing that the proper role of the First Amendment is to foster the
political dialogue necessary for self-governance).
30. SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2:28 (emphasis omitted).
31. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to . . . political expression . . . .”).
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choosing, promoting, or distributing private expression protected
under the First Amendment.
Thus, the following examples show that the Court has made a
consistent, pragmatic decision to place its faith in expert agencies’
abilities to make apolitical, merit-based decisions about which speech
to promote, protecting these decisionmakers from being sued by the
nongovernmental actors whose speech is disfavored. In subsequent
Parts, this Note argues that because the Court has given such
deference to those agency decisions, they must be treated as speech to
preserve the independent characteristics that warrant the Court’s
deference in the first place. Describing these three decisions serves
the dual purpose of familiarizing the reader with the Court’s most
relevant jurisprudence and introducing key First Amendment
concepts that will be referenced throughout the remainder of this
Note: public forum analysis, content and viewpoint neutrality, and the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
1. Public Forum Analysis and Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes.
In Arkansas Educational Television
32
Commission v. Forbes, the Court examined the claim that Ralph
Forbes, an independent candidate running for a seat in Arkansas’s
Third Congressional District, had been wrongfully excluded from a
candidate debate facilitated by the Arkansas Educational Television
Commission (AETC), a state-funded public broadcaster, in violation
33
of his First Amendment rights. Forbes’s exclusion was based on the
AETC’s decision to “limit participation in the debates to the major
party candidates or any other candidate who had strong popular
34
support.” Given Forbes’s reputation as a “perennial candidate who
had sought, without success, a number of elected offices in
35
Arkansas,” the AETC defended its decision as a “bona fide
journalistic judgement [sic] that [its] viewers would best be served by
36
limiting the debate.” After the Eighth Circuit held that the AETC
had created a public forum by “open[ing] its facilities to a particular
group—candidates running for the Third District Congressional

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
Id. at 669–71.
Id. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 671 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 61) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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seat” and found that Forbes’s First Amendment rights had been
violated, the Supreme Court examined the applicability of forum
38
analysis to the case.
Forum analysis, in its simplest form, divides government
property into three main categories: “the traditional public forum, the
public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic
39
forum.” Traditional public fora include streets, parks, and other
locations that “by long tradition . . . have been devoted to assembly
40
and debate.” In a traditional public forum, “the rights of the State to
limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed” and are subject to
41
strict scrutiny review. This same standard of review applies to the
second category, the designated public forum, in which a state opens
a forum to the public “even if it was not required to create the forum
42
in the first place.” Though the state can freely take away the “open
character” of these fora or limit them to “use by certain groups” or
43
“the discussion of certain subjects,” exclusion of a “speaker who falls
within the class to which a designated public forum is made generally
44
available . . . is subject to strict scrutiny.” The final category, the
nonpublic forum, is any other government property to which the state
can restrict access “as long as the restrictions are reasonable
and . . . not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
45
officials oppose the speaker’s view.”
Analyzing the facts of Forbes through the public-forum lens, the
Court determined that the AETC had not created a designated public
forum, due to the special nature of television broadcasting, as well as
the fact that access to the debate was “selective” rather than
46
“general.” Further, the “broad rights of access for outside speakers”

37. Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 93 F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 523
U.S. 666 (1998).
38. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 672.
39. Id. at 677 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985)).
40. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 46 n.7.
44. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
45. Id. at 677–78 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
46. See id. at 680 (comparing the AETC’s candidate-by-candidate determinations to
Cornelius’s agency-by-agency determinations and therefore finding that the AETC’s debate
“was a nonpublic forum”).
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required in a designated public forum “would be antithetical . . . to
the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to
47
fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.” Even
with political speech in play, the Court nonetheless concluded that
“the debate was a nonpublic forum,” primarily based on the fact that
the “AETC made candidate-by-candidate determinations as to which
48
of the eligible candidates would participate in the debate.” Having
made this determination, the Court held that the exclusion of Forbes
also had a viewpoint-neutral rational basis: the executive director of
the AETC cited the lack of public interest in Forbes’s campaign as
49
the overriding reason for his exclusion. Thus, the Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit and upheld a public broadcaster’s right to make
editorial decisions, even those concerning which politicians to include
50
in candidate debates.
With this decision, the Court demonstrated that it is highly
unlikely that forum analysis will create a situation in which the
editorial decision of a government-funded institution with
51
characteristics similar to those of the AETC will be subject to strict
52
scrutiny review. This decision also indicates that when making a
value judgment between providing all First Amendment speakers
47. Id. at 673.
48. Id. at 680.
49. See id. at 682 (“It is, in short, beyond dispute that Forbes was excluded not because of
his viewpoint but because he had generated no appreciable public interest.”). The Court’s
conclusion is supported by an earlier jury verdict that “Forbes’[s] exclusion was not based on
objections or opposition to his views.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See id. at 683 (“The broadcaster’s decision to exclude Forbes was a reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion consistent with the First Amendment.”).
Justice Stevens’s dissent pointed out that the majority did not harmonize this decision with the
neutrality rules that would have applied to analogous situations involving private broadcasters
under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 685–
86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the AETC’s decision, whether based on
“newsworthiness” or “political viability,” did not use preestablished objective criteria required
by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971). Yet the Court stressed that it did not intend to
permit public broadcasters to exercise unlimited editorial discretion in the realm of political
coverage, even within the bounds of viewpoint neutrality. See id. at 675–76 (majority opinion)
(“The very purpose of [a] debate [is] to allow the candidates to express their views with minimal
intrusion by the broadcaster.”).
51. Part III, infra, argues that a number of government institutions are similar to public
broadcasting outlets like the AETC.
52. Under the tripartite formula for forum analysis, regulations of both traditional public
fora and limited public fora are subject to strict scrutiny and must be both content- and
viewpoint-neutral. SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 8:9. Speech regulations in nonpublic fora only
require a viewpoint-neutral rational basis. Id. § 8:10.
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access to government-sponsored broadcasters with limited
resources—assuming the ability of those speakers to express their
views through alternate venues—and preserving the editorial
53
integrity of those institutions, the Court favors the latter.
Although this case indicates how courts should, moving forward,
resolve claims that the government has created a public forum when
the case involves a subsidy with an editorial character, the Court’s
unwillingness to find the existence of a traditional or designated
public forum does not eliminate the requirement that the government
54
choose among different actors on a viewpoint-neutral basis. It does,
however, ensure that the state must only articulate a reasonable,
55
viewpoint-neutral reason for its editorial choice. This Section next
56
examines National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley to explore
whether this minimal requirement has any real meaning—in terms of
providing an upper limit on the government’s power—within the
context of state subsidies for journalism, libraries, or the arts.
2. Unconstitutional Vagueness, Viewpoint Neutrality, and
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. Unlike Forbes, in which
the Court largely accepted the AETC’s claim that its decision to
exclude Forbes from the debate was not viewpoint-related, Finley
involved a situation in which the concern about undue government
influence on arts funding was warranted. The controversy underlying
this case stemmed from the 1990 amendment to the National
57
Foundation of the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, which required
the chairperson of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to
implement procedures in which the “general standards of decency
53. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 681–82 (“Were it faced with the prospect of cacophony, on the
one hand, and First Amendment liability, on the other, a public television broadcaster might
choose not to air candidates’ views at all. . . . In this circumstance, a ‘[g]overnment-enforced
right of access inescapably dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.’” (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 662, 656 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54. See id. at 682 (“[N]onpublic forum status ‘does not mean that the government can
restrict speech in whatever way it likes.’” (quoting Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 687 (1992))).
55. See id. at 677–78 (“The government can restrict access to a nonpublic forum ‘as long as
the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.’” (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985))).
56. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
57. National Foundation of the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 951–960
(2006), amended by Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512,
tit. III, § 318, 104 Stat. 1958, 1960.
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and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public”
58
would be “tak[en] into consideration” in the awarding of grants.
Public outrage over the NEA’s funding of certain controversial
artists, especially Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano,
59
eventually led Congress to reevaluate its oversight of the institution.
The final text of the amendment was a much milder alternative to
other versions, which sought to “eliminat[e] the NEA’s funding or
60
substantially constrain[] its grant-making authority.” Nevertheless, it
raised suspicion of political motivations in the selection process and
was subsequently challenged by four artists whose applications for
61
grants were denied following its adoption. Both the district court
and the Ninth Circuit ruled that the provision violated the First
Amendment on its face because of the overbreadth and vagueness of
the “decency and respect” language, and because it “violate[d] the
First Amendment’s prohibition on viewpoint-based restrictions on
62
protected speech.”
In a decision reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court
contemplated whether the requirement to consider “decency and
respect” in arts funding actually promoted—and consequently
63
required the NEA to advance—any particular viewpoint. The Court
determined that it did not based on three main factors: that the
provision merely required “consideration” rather than absolute
64
adherence; the bipartisan nature of the coalition supporting the

58. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1).
59. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 574–75 (explaining the “public controversy” stemming from
Mapplethorpe’s exhibit containing “homoerotic photographs that several members of Congress
condemned as pornographic” and from Serrano’s “Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix
immersed in urine,” both of which were indirectly funded by the NEA).
60. Id. at 581.
61. Id. at 577. The four artists—Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller—
claimed that the denial of funding was based on their “sexual politics,” and specifically their
graphic depictions of sexual abuse and homosexuality. Julie Ann Alanga, Note, 1991
Legislation, Reports and Debates over Federally Funded Art: Arts Community Left with an
“Indecent” Compromise, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1545, 1545 n.2, 1546 n.4 (1991).
62. Finley, 524 U.S. at 578, 579.
63. See id. at 580–81 (looking at the plain language and political context of the statute in
response to “respondents’ assertion that the provision compels the NEA to deny funding on the
basis of viewpoint discriminatory criteria”).
64. See id. (“Section 954(d)(1) adds ‘considerations’ to the grant-making process, it does
not preclude awards to projects that might be deemed ‘indecent’ or ‘disrespectful,’ nor place
conditions on grants, or even specify that those factors must be given any particular weight in
reviewing an application.”).
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65

amendment in Congress; and that the vagueness of the requirement,
instead of promoting arbitrary enforcement, allowed for “multiple
interpretations” and therefore would not automatically “preclude or
66
punish the expression of particular views.”
The Court also observed that the NEA necessarily had to take
content into consideration as a consequence of the nature of the
67
grantmaking process. By confining this discussion to decisions based
on content, the majority made a tenuous distinction between
permissible content-based criteria for awarding grants and
impermissible viewpoint-based criteria, which in practical terms
allowed the NEA to continue using subjective criteria in its
grantmaking process. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Scalia
proclaimed that the provision “unquestionably constitute[d]
viewpoint discrimination” and expressed doubts over whether any
68
meaningful distinction between the two can exist. Though
advocating for the opposite outcome in the case, Justice Souter
reached the same conclusion in his dissent: “[T]he decency and
69
respect provision on its face is quintessentially viewpoint based.”
This disagreement among the Justices about the meaning of and
difference between content and viewpoint discrimination
demonstrates the difficulty of relying upon a prohibition of viewpoint
discrimination, subject to review for its reasonableness, as the lone
check on overextension of government authority in the subsidy
context. As Professor Robert Post points out, “[i]n . . . settings
[analogous to the awarding of grants], speech is necessarily and
routinely constrained on the basis of both its content and its
70
viewpoint.”
Professor Frederick Schauer likewise expresses
skepticism about the applicability of the content-viewpoint dichotomy
to the arts-subsidy context, observing that “[t]o support painting but
not installations might not strike everyone as being about point of
65. See id. at 582 (“The legislation was a bipartisan proposal introduced as a counterweight
to amendments aimed at eliminating the NEA’s funding or substantially constraining its grantmaking authority.”).
66. See id. at 583 (“[T]he provision does not introduce considerations that, in practice,
would effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular views.”).
67. Id. at 585.
68. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that “[i]f there is any uncertainty
on the point, it relates only to the adjective . . . . That is, one might argue that the decency and
respect factors constitute content discrimination rather than viewpoint discrimination, which
would render them easier to uphold.” Id. at 593 n.1.
69. Id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 166 (1996).
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view, but my strong suspicion is that many contemporary artists
71
would disagree.”
The difficulty of articulating a constitutionally relevant
distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination in the
context of subsidies likely means that, following the formula
articulated in the majority opinion, courts will afford relief only for
the most egregious violations under an as-applied challenge. In
preserving a cause of action under the Free Speech Clause in cases
like Finley, however, the Court demonstrated its ongoing concern
with the possibility that an overbearing government could exercise
excessive control over the funding of speech activities close to the
core of First Amendment protections.
3. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and United States v.
American Library Ass’n.
According to the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, the state may not “deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of
72
speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.” In United
73
States v. American Library Ass’n, the Court confronted a
complicated case dealing with the constitutionality of a congressional
74
requirement that any library accepting federal assistance to provide
Internet access to its patrons must adopt “‘a technology protection
measure . . . that protects against access’ by all persons to ‘visual
depictions’ that constitute ‘obscen[ity]’ or ‘child pornography,’ and
that protects against access by minors to ‘visual depictions’ that are
75
‘harmful to minors.’” The Children’s Internet Protection Act
76
(CIPA) required a “technology protection measure” that would
“block[] or filter[] Internet access” to the categories of materials
77
described above. The district court found CIPA unconstitutional on

71. Schauer, supra note 9, at 105.
72. Id. at 210 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996))
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion).
74. Federal assistance came in the form of either discounted rates under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), or grants from the Institute of Museum and Library Sciences
(IMLS). Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 201.
75. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)(i),
(C)(i) (2006)).
76. CIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000) (codified in scattered
sections of 20 & 47 U.S.C.).
77. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 201 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(1)).
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its face on the basis that it imposed an unconstitutional condition on
78
public library funding.
The Supreme Court thus needed to determine whether CIPA
imposed “an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal
79
assistance” on libraries themselves.
In past cases, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine had been used to find that it was
impermissible “for the state to condition tax exemptions, welfare
benefits, and some forms of non-policy public employment on
refraining from engaging in otherwise protected speech unrelated to
80
the purpose of the governmental program.” But Professor Schauer
notes the difficulty in distinguishing unconstitutional conditions from
81
government speech. The decreasing success rate of unconstitutional
conditions claims and the increasing number of cases decided upon
the ground of the government speech doctrine bolster his
82
observation.
The Court provided a suitable example of this concept by basing
its denial of the American Library Association’s unconstitutional
conditions claim on the government’s ability to “define the limits of
83
[a] program” it has funded. Without reaching the question of
84
whether a public library has First Amendment rights, the majority
upheld the ability of Congress to “insist that these public funds be
85
spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.” The Court
did so with the understanding that “[t]o the extent that libraries wish
78. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev’d, 539
U.S. 194 (2003). The district court did not decide whether the plaintiffs had to demonstrate that
it was impossible for a library to comply with CIPA without violating the First Amendment to
succeed in facially invalidating the provision. Id. The court did, however, “assume without
deciding . . . that a facial challenge to CIPA require[d] plaintiffs to show that any public library
that complies with CIPA’s conditions [would] necessarily violate the First Amendment” and
“that CIPA’s constitutionality fail[ed] under this more restrictive test.” Id. Thus, though the
district court refrained from deciding which test was required, it did determine that CIPA would
fail the more restrictive test. Id.
79. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 210 (plurality opinion).
80. Schauer, supra note 9, at 102.
81. See id. (“Requiring an employee or contractor to speak the government’s message
will . . . look like an unconstitutional condition insofar as it conditions employment . . . on
speaking words with a certain content, but will look like government speech insofar as it
embodies the government’s prerogative of sending out its own message.”).
82. For an explanation of the government speech doctrine, see infra Part II.
83. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 211 (plurality opinion) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
84. See infra Part IV.
85. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212 (plurality opinion) (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 196)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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to offer unfiltered access [to the Internet], they are free to do so
without federal assistance,” which does not amount to a suppression
86
of the speech activity involved in providing Internet access. Further,
the Court explained that “[a] refusal to fund protected activity,
without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on
87
that activity.”
Though the plurality did not explicitly characterize the provision
in question as government speech, it used the language and principles
associated with the government speech doctrine to justify the ability
of the government to impose speech-related restrictions that support
88
an overriding governmental interest. The idea that, in cases
involving government subsidies, a restriction on speech within the
context of those subsidies will not violate the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine has led to an increasing tendency of lower courts
to decide as-applied challenges according to government speech
principles, characterizing the activity as the government’s own speech,
89
and thus not subject to First Amendment protection. This expansion
of the government speech doctrine threatens to diminish the
independence of smaller government entities by eliminating the
possibility of a distinction between politically motivated speech
mandated by the larger federal government and merit-based speech
propagated by an independent, government-funded entity.
II. THE EXPANDING GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
Though the Court might have reached similar results had it relied
upon the government speech doctrine to resolve the preceding three
cases, none of them analyzed the actions as speech of the government
itself. The number of situations in which courts use the “recently
90
minted government speech doctrine” in free speech cases, however,
has expanded greatly since American Library Ass’n. Lower courts
have shown an increased willingness to characterize speech selection
by the government as government communication through editorial
decisions, thus freeing the government from the First Amendment
scrutiny it is subject to when acting as a regulator of speech. This Part
briefly touches upon the development of the modern government
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193).
See id. at 210–14 (adopting the logic of Rust to explain the Court’s holding).
See infra Part II.C.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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speech doctrine; explains why its use in the context of public
broadcasters, libraries, and arts organizations could be problematic
for independent entities that, though funded by the government, are
not created to express the views of the party in power; and
demonstrates how lower courts have nevertheless drawn upon it
when dealing with issues involving editorial decisionmaking in arts
and broadcasting.
A. Origins and Tenets of the Government Speech Doctrine
The idea that one unified government speech doctrine exists is
somewhat misleading, as the question of what constitutes government
91
speech is without clear resolution. Despite this fundamental
definitional ambiguity, however, most scholars recognize the origins
92
of the modern government speech doctrine in Rust v. Sullivan, a
controversial decision in which the Court determined that a provision
requiring doctors who received Title X funding to refrain from
discussing abortion with patients did not violate the doctors’ First
93
Amendment rights. This decision rested upon the concept that the
government may provide funding to support programs “dedicated to
advanc[ing] certain permissible goals” consistent with state policy
94
without affording similar support to other organizations. Further,
the majority distinguished the selective funding decision in Rust from
an absolute regulation on speech—which would draw stricter scrutiny
under the Free Speech Clause—because the doctors affected were
“free . . . to pursue abortion-related activities when they [were] not
95
acting under the auspices of the Title X project.”
Despite continuing discomfort among scholars about this
96
opinion, courts have adopted two general principles from Rust when
91. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380–87 (2001) (outlining questions left unanswered by the
Court’s formulation of the government speech doctrine and presenting eight typologies of
government speech).
92. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
93. Id. at 192–96.
94. Id. at 194. The Court illustrated this principle by analogy, noting that “[w]hen Congress
established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt
democratic principles . . . it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage
competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” Id.
95. Id. at 198.
96. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech
When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1271–73 (2010) (arguing that
the Court erred in Rust by failing to engage in a searching inquiry of what message the
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dealing with government speech cases. First, when a government
entity is “speak[ing] for itself,” it has the right to “select the views
that it wants to express,” and “the Free Speech Clause has no
97
application.” Second, a decision to subsidize private expression will
likewise be exempt from First Amendment scrutiny if funding is
distributed “for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled
98
message.”
This second point must be read in conjunction with the first.
Courts analyze a government’s choice to subsidize certain messages
instead of others when not speaking for itself under public forum
doctrine, as exemplified by the decision in Rosenberger v. Rector and
99
Visitors of University of Virginia. In Rosenberger, the University of
Virginia’s policy of excluding student “religious activit[ies]” from
eligibility for funding by the Student Activities Fund (SAF), which
provided payment to certain groups “related to the educational
100
purpose of the University of Virginia,”
did not constitute
101
government speech. The Court grounded this decision on its
determination that “the University [did] not itself speak or subsidize
transmittal of a message it favor[ed] but instead expend[ed] funds to
102
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.” Thus, the
university had created a limited public forum for the expression of
private speech, which it could not limit based on viewpoint-based
103
criteria.

government sought to communicate); Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government
Speech, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1115, 1163–64 (2010) (noting that “Rust and Finley were deeply
unpopular decisions among scholars”).
97. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (citation omitted).
98. Id.
99. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (“It does
not follow . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does not itself
speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers.”); see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524
U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (“If the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of
subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different
case.”).
100. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824–25. The University also excluded “philanthropic
contributions and activities, political activities, activities that would jeopardize the University’s
tax-exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria or similar fees, or social
entertainment or related expenses” from SAF support. Id. at 825.
101. Id. at 837.
102. Id. at 834.
103. See id. at 830 (“The SAF is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or
geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.”).
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Rosenberger and Rust seem to create the possibility of
distinguishing between government speech and government subsidy
of private speech by examining whether the government is
104
Recent decisions,
purposefully espousing a certain message.
however, suggest that the government speech doctrine applies even in
situations in which the government has created a message but not
105
specifically claimed that message as its own. These decisions suggest
the expansion of the government speech doctrine and create the
possibility that it may be applied in the speech-selection context.
B. Why Analyzing Editorial Decisions of Government Actors as
Government Speech Is Problematic
Cases in which government actors make editorial choices in the
realm of the arts or humanities fall somewhere between the two
paradigms envisioned by the Rust line of cases and the Rosenberger
decision. On the one hand, the Forbes Court indicated that, at least in
the realm of broadcasting decisions, the “exercise[ of] editorial
discretion in the selection and presentation of . . . programming” is
“speech activity,” but the Court stopped short of calling it
106
government speech, thus distinguishing Forbes from Rust. On the
other hand, though these decisions deal with a situation similar to the
one in Rosenberger—in which “the State acts against a background
and tradition of thought . . . that is at the center of our intellectual and
107
philosophical tradition” —unlike in Rosenberger, the Court deemed
108
public forum analysis inapposite. Up to this point, the Court has
duly treated the cases examined in this Note as something of a middle
ground between government speech cases and public forum cases.
This Section posits that it would be problematic for the government
to move toward the Rust side in future analyses of cases in which a
104. See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96
GEO. L.J. 1, 22 (2007) (“The key difference between Rust and Rosenberger, then, lay in
understanding whose message was really at issue. In Rust, the government enlisted private
actors to deliver a governmental message, whereas in Rosenberger it attempted to discourage
certain private viewpoints.”).
105. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564–67 (2005) (concluding
that the government speech doctrine was applicable when analyzing a First Amendment
challenge to the government’s creation of advertising attributed to “America’s Beef
Producers”).
106. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
107. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
108. See, e.g., Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675 (“[P]ublic broadcasting as a general matter does not
lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine . . . .”).
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government institution selects among the expressive acts of
independent actors because the government is not communicating
any specific message.
Professor Randall Bezanson has extended Forbes’s logic to argue
“that government has the power to select speech by others as part of
109
its own expressive freedom.” This reasoning raises an important
point of contention: how clear must a governmental message be in
order to be deemed government speech? Justice Souter has criticized
recent decisions determined according to the government speech
doctrine as too tenuously identified as the government’s own opinion
110
to be excused from First Amendment analysis. Scholars have
likewise found fault with government speech cases in which the
governmental nature of the message communicated is not clear,
primarily based on the idea that political checks on government
abuses—like voting and protest—cannot function properly if the
public is not aware of the government’s backing of a certain
111
viewpoint.
These criticisms counsel against characterizing the
speech-selection judgments of organizations such as libraries, public
broadcast stations, and arts funding organizations as government
speech, as they do not clearly advance a particular government
message and, indeed, would likely be best understood by an observer
as communicating the message intended by the original speaker—that
is, the artist, writer, or journalist responsible for the original creative
act.
Those who do claim that cases such as Finley constitute
government speech argue that, though the government did not

109. Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and
Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 975 (1998) (positing that the
Court’s decision in Finley could be explained only if “through the selection system itself and in
the totality of selected expression, government is pursuing an expressive end, which is to
persuade and teach people to value art that satisfies certain tastes and standards—and
necessarily to devalue art that fails those standards”).
110. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“To avoid relying on a per se rule to say when speech is
governmental, the best approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully
informed observer would understand the expression to be government speech . . . .”); Johanns,
544 U.S. at 571–72 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[A] compelled subsidy should not be justifiable by
speech unless the government must put that speech forward as its own.”).
111. See generally Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587
(2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has shielded the government’s expression from Free Speech
Clause scrutiny, identifying political accountability measures like voting and petitioning—rather
than First Amendment litigation—as the appropriate resource for those displeased with their
government’s message.”).
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articulate a specific message like the anti-abortion agenda in Rust, the
NEA’s “programmatic” selection of certain artworks at the exclusion
of others could be seen as a communicative act, expressing what the
112
government considered to be excellence in art. Professor Bezanson
asserts that selective editorial judgments made by government entities
like arts organizations, museums, and universities can be considered
government speech as long as (1) “the purpose served by such
government speech-selection judgments [is] itself . . . expressive” and
(2) “government’s expressive activities [do] not displace competing
113
speech from the market.” Although the claim that the government
is expressing its views on “excellence” through speech-selection
judgments is theoretically plausible, it does not account for the fact
that the judgment of experts, performed independently and shielded
from political influence, is one of the key characteristics that allows
114
these organizations to perform their designated functions. Thus, it
would be strange to equate this exercise of independent judgment
with any calculated, predetermined message the government intended
to convey. Though this Note suggests that it would be problematic to
treat these types of cases as government speech cases, lower courts
have begun to interpret controversies involving similar fact patterns
using the government speech doctrine as their determinative
framework.
C. The Government Speech Doctrine and State Editorial Judgment in
the Circuits
In the lower courts, the idea that an editorial decision made by a
government-funded entity is government speech has been used as the
rationale for exempting the judgments of arts and broadcast
organizations from First Amendment scrutiny. Because the Court has
not articulated a precise test to guide the lower courts in determining
115
when the government is speaking for itself, the circuits’ use of the

112. Bezanson, supra note 109, at 978–79. The slippage in Professor Bezanson’s argument
about who in the government is creating the “programmatic” message—Congress, the
president, or the NEA—is part of the problem that arises when “government speech” is treated
as a monolithic entity. This Note seeks to illuminate that issue.
113. Id. at 979.
114. See infra Part III.A.
115. See generally Lilia Lim, Four-Factor Disaster, 83 WASH. L. REV. 569 (2008) (arguing
that “[w]hile the Supreme Court has explained some of the things government can do when it is
speaking, it has not clearly explained how to tell whether government is speaking in the first
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government speech doctrine to analyze these cases is not unexpected.
Moreover, given that the Court’s practical approach has been to defer
to the judgment of arts and broadcast organizations when they are
acting within an acceptable institutional framework and according to
their articulated goals, the outcome of these cases appears correct.
The fact that these courts have used the government speech doctrine
as a way to exempt these organizations from First Amendment
analysis, however, appears problematic based on the reasoning
discussed in the previous Section.
116
In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Gittens, the
D.C. Circuit considered whether the District of Columbia
Commission on the Arts and Humanities (Commission) violated the
First Amendment rights of the animal-rights-advocacy organization
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) in denying
PETA’s submission to a public art project, which the organization
117
paid to have displayed as part of a sponsorship program. The
Commission “reserve[d] the right of design approval” for works
118
Pursuant to this stated policy, the
submitted by sponsors.
Commission rejected three sketches—primarily depicting elephants in
119
120
circuses exposed to harsh conditions —submitted by PETA. PETA
sued, arguing that the Commission had created a designated public
forum for those participating in the sponsorship program and had
violated PETA’s First Amendment rights by excluding it from that
121
forum.
The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that “[a]s a
speaker, and as a patron of the arts, the government is free to
122
communicate some viewpoints while disfavoring others.” On the
one hand, the court’s recitation of doctrine is accurate, given that
when it speaks, the government is free to communicate some
place,” and advocating for the abandonment of a four-factor test created and applied by certain
circuits).
116. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
117. Id. at 25–26.
118. Id. at 26.
119. PETA’s rejected designs included “an elephant with a sign tacked to its side stating:
The CIRCUS is Coming See: Torture Starvation Humiliation All Under the Big Top,” “a sad
shackled circus elephant with a trainer poking a sharp stick at him,” and “a shackled elephant
crying” with a sign on it reading “The Circus is coming. See SHACKLES—BULL HOOKS—
LONELINESS. All under the ‘Big Top.’” Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 27.
122. Id. at 30.
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viewpoints at the exclusion of others. On the other hand, the court’s
equation of the government in its role as a speaker with its role as
patron of the arts is not supported by existing First Amendment case
123
law. Further, it did not articulate the reasoning behind the leap from
the characterization of the selection activity as speech to the
classification of the speech as a government message. As explained at
the beginning of this Section, the D.C. Circuit’s decision is reasonable
given the circumstances. The point here is simply to problematize the
fact that government speech was the determinative rationale cited in
taking the Commission’s actions out of the realm of First Amendment
review.
A case in which a circuit similarly exempted a government
entity’s selection decisions from Free Speech Clause scrutiny was
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of
124
Missouri. This decision involved the claim of the Ku Klux Klan
(KKK) that a university-owned public radio station violated its First
Amendment rights by denying the KKK’s request to sponsor the
125
station. In analyzing this claim, the Eighth Circuit began by stating
“first
and
foremost”
that
the
station’s
“underwriting
acknowledgments constitute governmental speech on the part of [the
126
University of Missouri].” The court properly interpreted Forbes in
concluding that the station’s editorial activities constitute speech. But,
like the D.C. Circuit in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
the Eighth Circuit did not explain the analytical leap from the
university-owned radio station—which the government has clearly
indicated should not be considered an entity expressing views of the
127
state —engaging in speech activity to the government speaking for
itself.
Instead of trying to make these editorial decisions fit into a
government speech doctrine that does not seem particularly
123. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 611–12 (1998) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Government would have us liberate government-as-patron from First
Amendment strictures not by placing it squarely within the categories of government-as-buyer
or government-as-speaker, but by recognizing a new category by analogy to those accepted
ones. The analogy is, however, a very poor fit, and this patronage falls embarrassingly on the
wrong side of the line between government-as-buyer or -speaker and government-as-regulatorof-private-speech.”).
124. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir.
2000).
125. Id. at 1089–90.
126. Id. at 1093.
127. See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
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appropriate for their unique circumstances, this Note proposes that,
as a complement to giving these organizations the freedom they need
to operate as the government intends, their speech-selection activity
should be treated as speech subject to First Amendment protection.
This characterization would allow courts to shield independent
agency actors in a situation in which the larger government oversteps
its bounds and subverts a government agency into a forum for
expressing political, social, or other viewpoints of the party in power.
III. SPECIALIZED FIRST AMENDMENT TREATMENT WHEN THE
GOVERNMENT ACTS AS “[P]ATRON OF THE [A]RTS, . . .
[B]ROADCASTER, AND [L]IBRARIAN”
Scholars have recognized the fundamental difference between
128
the government’s role as a regulator and its role as an allocator —
129
specifically, as “patron of the arts, . . . broadcaster, and librarian.”
As an allocator, the federal government plays an important part in
supporting and subsidizing the cultural life of the nation through its
funding of agencies and corporations. It also steps into a realm of
complicated First Amendment considerations, as the line between
controlling speech and speaking becomes blurry. Professor Schauer
has argued that in certain situations, it makes sense to “allow[] First
Amendment outcomes to turn on the particular characteristics
130
of . . . specific institutions.” This Part examines why organizations
such as libraries, arts organizations, and public broadcasting entities
should be afforded specialized First Amendment status on the basis
of their institutional characteristics. The three main justifications for
treating these types of institutions as unique for Free Speech Clause
purposes are their particular institutional goals and framework, their
close proximity to the goals of the First Amendment, and the
resemblance of their independent editorial decisions to speech
activity.

128. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27–29 (1996) (recognizing
“another sphere of state activity of growing importance in the twentieth century, in which the
state acts not as a regulator but as an allocator”).
129. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
130. Schauer, supra note 9, at 86.
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A. Unique Institutional Characteristics
To support the goal of promoting excellence in the arts and
humanities, the federal government has created three federal
agencies responsible for public broadcasting, arts funding, and
support and maintenance of libraries and museums: respectively, the
131
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), the NEA, and the
132
Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS).
Though
government funding in these functional areas is far-reaching and
includes within its purview many state, local, and nonprofit
organizations, an examination of these three principal federal
organizations illustrates the internal framework that makes these
types of institutions worthy of special consideration under the First
Amendment.
One of Congress’s main concerns when creating these
institutions was the need to maintain their independence. Its
approach to implementing this goal was, primarily, to create a
decentralized governing structure for organizations promoting
133
134
development in arts and journalism as a way to ensure that their
decisions were made according to the guidance of experts and not the
influence of outside government actors. The CPB, for example,
provides a model for congressional protection of the independent
decisionmaking process of institutional journalists. First, its enabling
act explicitly states that it is “not . . . an agency or establishment of
135
the United States Government.” It goes on to require that the
CPB’s board of directors, appointed by the president, be comprised of
136
members of diverse political parties and of experts in the relevant
137
field. The act specifies that the CPB must choose which programs to
131. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (2006).
132. The NEA, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the IMLS are all
established within the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities. 20 U.S.C. §§ 953,
9102 (2006).
133. See S. Rep. No. 91-879, at 1–2 (1970), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3461, 3462 (noting
the concern that “legislation to foster support of the arts and humanities could bring about
establishment of a central federal control of the arts and humanities” and reporting that this
problem had not arisen in large part due to the “26-member council, which represents a broad
geographical, cultural, and school cross section of the country”).
134. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (“[A] private corporation should be created to facilitate the
development of public telecommunications and to afford maximum protection from extraneous
interference and control.”).
135. Id. § 396(b).
136. Id. § 396(c)(1).
137. Id. § 396(c)(2).
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fund “on the basis of comparative merit” as determined by “panels of
138
outside experts.” Finally, to further distance the CPB from the final
product presented to the public, it is not permitted to “own[] or
operat[e] any television or radio broadcast station,” nor is it able to
139
directly “produc[e] programs.” In most instances the CPB provides
funding to stations that are directly owned or primarily supported by
state or local governments, but these channels are subject to similarly
140
strict governing structures.
Arts organizations and public libraries have put into place
similarly restrictive procedural mandates designed to separate these
types of institutions from political influence. The activities of the
NEA, for example, are reviewed by the National Council on the Arts
(Council), a panel composed of eighteen voting members, not
employed by the government, who are appointed according to their
demonstrated expertise in the arts and their diversity of
141
perspectives. The majority in Finley favorably cited the Council and
the smaller advisory panels that review grant applications as part of
142
its rationale behind upholding the NEA’s grantmaking decisions.
Public libraries generally have their own stated policies regarding
the acquisition and removal of books, which tend to comport with the
values of the American Library Association (ALA), the leading
nonprofit organization providing guidance on the operation of public
143
libraries. Both the plurality and the dissent in American Library

138. Id. § 396(g)(2)(B)(i).
139. Id. § 396(g)(3).
140. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 761–62
(1996) (plurality opinion) (explaining that “[p]ublic access channels . . . are normally subject to
complex supervisory systems of various sorts”).
141. 20 U.S.C. § 955(b)(1)(C) (2006). Six members of Congress also sit on the Council, but
they are not permitted to vote and are selected to represent a diverse cross section of both
houses and both main political parties. Id. § 955(b)(1)(B).
142. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573–75, 580–81 (1998)
(pointing out the importance of “ensuring the representation of various backgrounds and points
of view on the advisory panels that analyze grant applications”).
143. Compare NYPL’s Mission Statement, N.Y. PUB. LIBRARY, Mission & Priorities,
http://www.nypl.org/help/about-nypl/mission (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (“The mission of The
New York Public Library is to inspire lifelong learning, advance knowledge, and strengthen our
communities.”), with Mission of Priorities, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/ala/
aboutala/missionhistory/mission/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (“The stated mission is, ‘To
provide leadership for the development, promotion, and improvement of library and
information services and the profession of librarianship in order to enhance learning and ensure
access to information for all.’”).
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144

Ass’n point to the ALA’s Library Bill of Rights as an example of
how public libraries’ collection development is governed, and both
suggest that, due to this stated governance procedure, collection
145
development should be afforded deference. The aforementioned
institutions’ federally mandated or independently adopted governing
procedures afford them the independent status necessary to make
them institutions deserving special treatment under the First
Amendment.
B. Upholding Core Free Speech Values
As Professor Schauer points out, “the arts, libraries, . . . and the
146
institutional press” share “a certain First Amendment aura.” These
organizations, through their shared function of compiling and
distributing information to the public, are central contributors to the
First Amendment goal of “affording the public access to discussion,
147
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.” Professor
Owen Fiss places the value of these organizations in their capacity to
“free art from strict dependence on the market or privately controlled
wealth” and, by doing so, to “further[] the value that underlies the
First Amendment: our right and duty to govern ourselves reflectively

144. AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS (1996), available at http://www.ala.org/
ala/issuesadvocacy/intfreedom/librarybill/lbor.pdf.
145. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(citing the ALA’s Library Bill of Rights as a demonstration of a public library’s traditional role);
id. at 239–41 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing various ALA policies as conflicting with the
government policy of requiring filtering software to be installed on Internet terminals in public
libraries).
146. Schauer, supra note 9, at 116. Professor Schauer includes “universities” in his list of
institutions holding a special place in First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. This Note does not
address universities or other public educators because, though they do share the need to make
editorial choices with the three types of institutions discussed—for example, in the selection of
teachers, curriculum, and speakers—there are a number of other factors that make public
schools and universities unique, and the Court has afforded them an individualized species of
review based on these factors. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (“[The] danger [of chilling individual thought and expression] is especially
real in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and tradition of thought
and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (“[W]e have recognized that the university is a traditional
sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the
Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to
the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines
of the First Amendment.”).
147. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
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148

and deliberately.” Though this is not the only widely recognized
149
value underlying the Free Speech Clause, it is a central reason why
these organizations deserve special status under the First
Amendment. By funding the communication of viewpoints that might
150
otherwise be silenced, their activities further the public’s “right to
151
receive information and ideas.”
To demonstrate how these types of agencies help to fulfill this
goal, it is instructive to revisit the enabling acts of the IMLS, NEA,
and CPB. These statutes are uniformly concerned with the need to
educate the public by providing access to a wide variety of viewpoints
and with conducting targeted outreach to disadvantaged persons and
communities. For example, the Library Services and Technology
152
Act, the current enabling statute for the IMLS, charges the
organization “to facilitate access to resources in all types of libraries
153
for the purpose of cultivating an educated and informed citizenry”
and mandates that a large percentage of its funds be used for
“targeting library services to individuals of diverse geographic,
cultural, and socioeconomic backgrounds, to individuals with
disabilities, and to individuals with limited functional literacy or
154
information skills.” In a similar fashion, the enabling statute for the
NEA, as amended in 1990, describes its purposes in terms of
“fulfill[ing] its educational mission, achiev[ing] an orderly
continuation of free society, and provid[ing] models of excellence to
155
the American people.” This statute, too, has specific provisions
pointing to the organization’s goal of reaching diverse communities
156
and supporting multiple viewpoints.
Likewise, the Public
157
Broadcasting Act of 1967, which created the CPB, stated as its aim
to “encourage the development of programming that involves
148. FISS, supra note 128, at 48.
149. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
150. See FISS, supra note 128, at 37 (arguing that the First Amendment interest in promoting
public debate should include a “qualitative dimension” concerned with “exposing the public to
diverse and conflicting viewpoints on issues of public importance”).
151. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969)).
152. Library Services and Technology Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 9101–9176 (2006).
153. Id. § 9121(3).
154. Id. § 9141(a)(5).
155. Id. § 951(11).
156. See id. § 951(10) (“It is vital to a democracy to honor and preserve its multicultural
artistic heritage as well as support new ideas . . . .”).
157. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390–399 (2006).
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creative risks and that addresses the needs of unserved and
158
underserved audiences.”
Because their resources are finite, these organizations must make
choices about what information to disseminate to the public, and they
159
cannot give voice to every minority viewpoint. The institutional
structures discussed in Section A, however, make these organizations
particularly well suited to engage in important editorial decisions
consistent with the First Amendment goals discussed in this Note.
C. Engaging in Speech Activity
In addition to the similar goals underlying their creation, these
institutions are similar in the way they must promote “excellence” by
making editorial judgments about which stories are worthy of
coverage, which art works are worth funding, and which books will
make a positive contribution to a library. These functions, although
diverse in the subject matter with which they deal, are similar in that
they require “the freedom to make viewpoint-based choices in the
160
Likewise, these organizations’ editorial
selection of speech.”
activities involve selection from among the speech of other actors
rather than the direct creation of content. A salient question,
therefore, is whether the compilation of the speech of other actors
can itself be viewed as a type of speech. This Note argues that it can
be in the particularized contexts discussed herein.
As discussed in Part I, the Court in Forbes explicitly recognized
that the act of “exercis[ing] editorial discretion in . . . selection and
presentation” and “the compilation of the speech of third parties” can
161
be viewed as “speech activity” in the broadcast context. To come to
this conclusion, the Forbes majority relied heavily on the unique
characteristics of broadcasting to justify why a television station’s

158. Id. § 396(a)(6).
159. But see FISS, supra note 128, at 42 (arguing that institutions like the NEA must be
cautious not to apply their discretion in a way that would “impoverish public debate by
systematically disfavoring views the public needs for self-governance”).
160. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1440. Professors Bezanson and Buss term this
activity an exercise of “[e]ditorial judgment” in the context of public broadcasting. Id. But given
that all of the institutions discussed in this Note undergo the similar task of choosing from
among the speech of other actors based necessarily, in part, on content- or viewpoint-related
criteria, this Note uses the term in a broader sense. In an earlier article, Professor Bezanson
refers to the same types of decisions as “speech selection judgments,” a term this Note also uses
throughout. Bezanson, supra note 109, at 954.
161. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
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editorial decisions should be viewed as speech. Thus, instead of
requiring the “intent to convey a particularized message” typically
considered when the Court decides whether an activity should be
163
considered speech under the First Amendment, the majority simply
stated that the station’s selection decisions should be considered
164
speech in order to allow it to fulfill its journalistic role. In other
words, the public broadcasters in Forbes were engaging in speech
activity because they were acting with the discretion required “to
fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations” in a
situation in which viewpoint-based decisionmaking was inevitable and
165
public forum analysis was inapposite.
One can easily extend the Court’s reasoning behind recognizing
the editorial decisionmaking in Forbes as speech to organizations that
engage in similar activities. Just as content-based discrimination is an
intrinsic part of creating a television or radio broadcast, so too is it
unavoidable in the awarding of arts grants. In this context, the
“editorial” activity of the NEA and its affiliates is to review
competing submissions, with the inevitable result that some artists—
or organizations, given the current limitations on providing individual
funding to artists—do not receive funding. The Court has conceded
that “[a]ny content-based considerations that may be taken into
account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature
166
of arts funding,” and has gone even further to say that “[t]he ‘very
assumption’ of the NEA is that grants will be awarded according to
the ‘artistic worth of competing applicants,’ and absolute neutrality is
167
simply ‘inconceivable.’”

162. Id. at 673–75; see also Schauer, supra note 9, at 91–92 (“[I]n the end it is the
institutional character of public broadcasting as broadcasting, heightened here by the
involvement of broadcasting professionals in the very decision under attack, that appears to
have determined the outcome of [Forbes].”).
163. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam); see also Robert Post,
Essay, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1251 (1995) (explaining
that the “Spence test” is typically used to determine “whether particular conduct possesses
sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play” (quoting Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673–75 (“Were the judiciary to require, and so to define and
approve, pre-established criteria for access, it would risk implicating the courts in judgments
that should be left to the exercise of journalistic discretion.”).
165. Id.
166. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998).
167. Id. (quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795–96 (1st Cir. 1976)).
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Finally, as with the other two categories under examination, the
Court has stated that “[t]o fulfill their traditional missions, public
libraries must have broad discretion to decide what material to
168
provide to their patrons.” Consistent with this discretion, “[p]ublic
library staffs necessarily consider content in making collection
169
decisions.”
Indeed, the Court has explicitly recognized the
analogous principles underlying the need for government-sponsored
broadcasters, arts supporters, and librarians to use content-based
analysis in making decisions consistent with their statutory
170
obligations. Therefore, analyzing these types of decisions as similar
speech activity appears to be consistent with the Court’s
understanding of the First Amendment status of these institutions.
The next Part discusses how the independent judgment and
expressive activity of these types of organizations could allow them to
be characterized as First Amendment rightsholders.
IV. AFFORDING INDEPENDENT AGENCIES FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
This Note suggests that when a government agency compiles the
independent speech of other First Amendment actors, the agency
may be engaging in speech activity. This speech activity is separate
from that of the primary speakers—that is, those who created the
books or artworks being selected—and it is also different from the
clearly articulated governmental message typically associated with the
government speech doctrine. Though finding a meaningful limitation
on the selection processes of libraries, museums, arts organizations,
and journalists is demonstrably difficult, this Note suggests a
somewhat counterintuitive solution: recognizing the First
Amendment rights of these types of government institutions. This
Part first addresses the theoretical justification for treating a
government agency as a First Amendment rightsholder; it then
explores the procedural safeguards necessary for recognition of this
right to be protective and encouraging of speech, rather than chilling

168. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 204 (2003) (plurality opinion).
169. Id. at 205.
170. See id. (“The principles underlying Forbes and Finley also apply to a public library’s
exercise of judgment in selecting the material it provides to its patrons. Just as forum analysis
and heightened judicial scrutiny are incompatible with the role of public television stations and
the role of the NEA, they are also incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must
have to fulfill their traditional missions.”).
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and inhibiting. Finally, this Part revisits American Library Ass’n as an
example of how this Note’s proposed framework could have been
used to better preserve the free speech interests of public libraries
without infringing upon their need to exercise editorial judgment in
collection development activities.
A. Government Institutions as First Amendment Rightsholders: A
Theoretical Framework
Professors Randall Bezanson and William Buss succinctly pose
the question this Section proposes to answer: “Why should
government speech be viewed as a First Amendment right, or
freedom, rather than a form of government regulation or government
action entitled to a degree of privilege or immunity from First
171
Amendment scrutiny?” To address this query, one must first
consider the actual text of the Free Speech Clause to elucidate
whether a government institution could be considered a rightsholding
entity according to the plain language and the historical meaning of
the text. Second, one must consider what goals the First Amendment
is trying to achieve. Depending upon the type of government they
envision, scholars have provided different answers to this question,
and the manner in which this question is answered has direct bearing
upon the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
1. Supporting a Government Claim to First Amendment
Protection with Text and History. The Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment is remarkably simple, considering the complex legal
questions it has inspired over the years. It simply states that
172
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”
Despite the sparse nature of the text, Professor David Fagundes has
pointed out the significance of the fact that the plain language “does
not identify any limitations on the identities of the speakers on whom
173
This “object-neutrality”
[its protections are] bestowed.”
distinguishes the First Amendment from others that grant rights to
174
specific persons or entities.
Though Professor Fagundes’s

171. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1452.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
173. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1648.
174. See id. (“For example, section one of the Fifteenth Amendment and section two of the
Fourteenth Amendment grant voting rights and privileges and immunities safeguards,
respectively, but only to ‘citizens of the United States.’”).
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observation does not necessitate an understanding of the Free Speech
Clause as protective of the government’s own speech, it does
“militate[] against a doctrinal rule that categorically excludes any
175
speaker from the ambit of the clause’s protection.”
Other scholars have read the plain language of the amendment
differently, arguing that the First Amendment functions as an explicit
restraint on government power, making its operation as a protector of
176
the government nonsensical. This argument relies, however, on the
dual assumptions that the First Amendment’s primary goal is to
restrain the government and that “the government” is one entity.
Based purely on the text of the First Amendment, Professor
Fagundes’s point about its object neutrality seems to be the more
persuasive guide to interpreting its plain meaning. Therefore, the
plain language of the amendment does not appear to provide any
indication that the government should be excluded from receiving the
protections promised by the Free Speech Clause.
The legislative history behind the Bill of Rights and events from
the early republic support the idea that the Framers purposely
omitted a specific entity from the First Amendment and that
government speech rights are not antithetical to the Framers’
177
understanding of the amendment. First, the text of the amendment
was changed from prohibiting abridgement of the right of the people
178
to speak to its current object-neutral form. The adopted form was
also enacted in the face of proposals to make the amendment’s
179
applicability to individual persons clearer. Second, in the early
republic, political figures such as James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson placed great importance upon the ability of state and local
governments to promote freedom of expression and to speak out
180
against the federal government.

175. Id. at 1651.
176. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1501–04 (“If the government can claim to act as
a First Amendment right holder, the First Amendment loses coherence, for in such situations
there is nothing for the First Amendment to act on or constrain.”).
177. See Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1651–58 (“[T]he available historical evidence does aid
in understanding the problem at hand, both by shedding some additional light on the objectneutrality of the First Amendment and by revealing that the framers did possess some
understanding of government speech and expected such speech to play a significant role in the
nascent constitutional republic.”).
178. Id. at 1652.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1654–58.
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Professor Fagundes interprets these historical facts as indicating
the Framers’ intention not to limit the applicability of the Free
Speech Clause to individuals and their recognition of the need to
allow at least state and local governments to speak in order to fulfill
181
their roles in the federal system. Further, his historical analysis
supports the idea that the original intent of the Framers was not to
categorically exclude government expression from the ambit of Free
Speech Clause protection. Though this interpretation addresses
potential claims that the First Amendment excludes government
speech on its face, the counterargument does raise important
concerns about the central aims of the Free Speech Clause—aims that
must also be considered when interpreting the amendment.
2. Reconciling First Amendment Goals with the Protection of
Government Speech. The commonly held understanding of the Free
Speech Clause is that it is libertarian in its aims, “operat[ing] to
182
protect individual liberty against government oppression.”
A
number of scholars, however, have suggested that the amendment
may have an alternate or complementary purpose, enabling rather
than limiting in nature. As discussed in Part I, the democratic selfgovernance theory posits that the First Amendment is “a mechanism
for protecting the robustness of public debate [and] for exposing the
public to diverse and conflicting viewpoints on issues of public
183
importance.” This understanding of the amendment not only
eliminates the aforementioned concern about the disconnect between
protection of state speech and the idea that the Free Speech Clause
primarily operates to limit state action, but also elevates the
government speech act to one that could “further[] the Constitution’s
184
systemic goal of maintaining a free and open marketplace of ideas.”
Professor Fiss takes this theory one step further, arguing that,
when the state is acting as an allocator, not only does the First
Amendment require the promotion of increased public debate, but
181. See id. at 1659 (“[S]ources from the post-revolutionary period suggest not only that the
framers had some rudimentary notion of government (or at least, state) speech, but also that
they regarded this speech as central to the constitutional scheme both in terms of substance
(informing and enriching the system of freedom of expression) and structure (providing an
additional bulwark of protection against possible federal overreaching).”).
182. Id.
183. FISS, supra note 128, at 37; see also Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1659–61 (discussing the
influence of James Harrington on the Framers and explaining his view that the state was “a
body that could enhance individual rights through democratic participation”).
184. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1662.
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also that a correlative affirmative duty exists for the state to remain a
neutral participant by ensuring that disadvantaged viewpoints have
185
the opportunity to be heard. Professor Fagundes adopts a similar
principle, which he refers to as the “public rights view,” as the
underlying rationale behind his argument that protection of
government speech should sometimes be recognized under the Free
186
Speech Clause. Under this view, protection for expressive activity of
the state makes sense when two criteria are fulfilled. First, the state’s
actions must promote public debate and expose the citizenry to a
187
variety of ways of looking at the world. Second, the institution
speaking must be speaking in a way that is central to its intended
188
purpose and in which it is particularly well-suited to engage.
The problem with advocating for this view of the First
Amendment is that, although the Supreme Court has expressed ideas
189
sympathetic to it at times, the dominant view expressed in the
Court’s jurisprudence is the libertarian interpretation of the Free
190
Speech Clause. These two views, however, are not necessarily
185. See FISS, supra note 128, at 27–49 (using the Mapplethorpe controversy to argue that
supposedly neutral criteria like decency and artistic excellence “should never be employed in a
way that impairs the robustness of public debate or cuts the public off from unorthodox ideas”
and must be considered in conjunction with the need to preserve “views the public needs for
self-governance”).
186. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1672–76.
187. See id. (“If we are to determine whether speech merits constitutional protection by
reference to a substantive rather than a formal conception of expressive freedom—that is, by
looking at whether the speech at issue tends to ‘facilitate the public debate required for selfgovernment’—then the speech of government, as much as of individuals or private
organizations, may further this goal and thereby attain constitutional stature.” (footnote
omitted)).
188. See id. at 1676–77 (“[W]here the expressive conduct at issue is so central to the identity
and purpose of the public entity that to allow it to be overborne by the will of another sovereign
would undermine the reason for allocating institutional discretion to that speaker in the first
instance, then constitutional status for that speech may be appropriate.”).
189. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–72 (1982) (“If petitioners intended by
their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and
if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners’ decision, then petitioners have exercised their
discretion in violation of the Constitution.” (footnote omitted)); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969) (“[T]he Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“[T]he State may not, consistently with the
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge.”).
190. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press from governmental
interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government.” (emphasis omitted)); see
also Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1674 (“Courts have been chary of adopting the public rights
view, and the pluralist commitment to content-neutrality still retains its centrality in Speech
Clause jurisprudence.”).
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191

diametrically opposed. Through institutions engaging in speech
selection, the government could be understood to be both promoting
public debate and potentially limiting it, depending on the motivation
behind the selection judgments and the source of the principles by
which these judgments are made. In the specific types of institutions
with which this Note deals, promotion of public discourse is
inextricably bound up with the character and purposes of the
192
agency. Therefore, it follows that the public-rights conception of the
First Amendment—which is essentially the same as Meiklejohn’s
democratic self-governance conception—is a particularly useful free
speech framework to consider when dealing with these types of cases.
Having demonstrated that protection of creative agencies under
the Free Speech Clause is possible based on the amendment’s text,
history, and goals, the next step is to discuss how this protection may
realistically be afforded to have the desired effect of promoting
democratic discourse through these agencies’ actions.
B. A Model for Granting First Amendment Rights to Agencies Acting
as Broadcaster, Arts Patron, and Librarian
As this Note has argued, granting First Amendment rights to
certain government institutions could provide an appropriate analytic
framework in cases in which the discretion needed to promote the
democratic exchange of ideas conflicts with the need for protection
from the overreaching of the larger federal government. Professor
Fagundes has posited that a principled approach to determining when
government institutions should be treated as First Amendment
rightsholders would involve granting these rights only when the
“expressive conduct at issue is . . . central to the identity and purpose
of the public entity” and when the speech furthers the goal of
193
promoting free democratic exchange.
Given the difficulty of
formulating a test for when government action has actually promoted
free democratic exchange, however, this Note proposes that a more
workable solution would be to presumptively recognize First

191. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1676 (“Government speaks, but its twin capacities to both
enrich and imperil the system of freedom of expression, along with its coercive authority, make
it unlike any other speaker. A completely theorized account of the constitutional status of
government speech must take this duality into account.”).
192. See supra Part III.B.
193. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1676–77.
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Amendment rights for a certain category of institutions. The
institution’s right to engage in speech-selection judgments would then
be protected as long as the organization were functioning according
to an appropriate internal regulatory framework, which the
institution’s experts are better suited to create than the courts.
Courts’ recognition of a particular category of government
institutions in which state speech is protected by the First
Amendment would allow these organizations to turn to a neutral
arbiter when their discretion is being infringed by an outside state
actor without forcing them to give up their decisionmaking power by
195
becoming an unrestricted forum for expression.
This Section
examines the plausibility of such a solution by reviewing precedential
cases in which the Supreme Court has indicated that certain
government institutions may have independent rights under the Free
Speech Clause and considering the procedural framework that must
be in place to prevent abuses of the system.
1. Building upon Precedent. This Note has pointed out that in
American Library Ass’n, a plurality of the Court left open the
possibility of granting First Amendment rights to government
institutions. But in another plurality opinion, the Court went beyond
allowing for the possibility of granting a government institution First
Amendment rights to implicitly doing so. In Denver Area Educational
196
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, the Court struck down an
FCC regulation permitting cable operators to prevent transmission of
offensive programming on public access channels, effectively
upholding the local public access channels’ right to speak over the
federal government’s grant of the power of censorship to private
197
cable operators. Supporting this conclusion was the fact that the
194. Professor Fagundes explores the possibly of a similar solution, which he refers to as the
“institutional rights theory.” Id. at 1667–71. He rejects the theory as too vulnerable to
systematic abuses. See id. at 1670–71 (“[A]n institutional rights approach offers some promise,
but the risk of abuse it poses makes it inadequate as a sole means of determining when
government speech merits constitutional status.”).
195. But see Bezanson, supra note 109, at 993 (“The responsibility for limiting government
speech claims cannot be placed on those persons or offices or branches that themselves engage
in the speech. Nor can an informed public be relied upon to limit government’s speech activities,
for it is in misinforming the public that the greatest danger of government speech exists. So the
duty must fall, by necessity, on the judicial branch, which must administer and judge the utility
of government speech, its accuracy, value, and effect . . . .”).
196. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
197. See id. at 760–66 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the provision must be struck down
in light of “the risk that the [cable operator’s] veto itself may be mistaken; and its use, or
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regulation did not appear necessary to achieve the legislative goal of
protecting children from inappropriate conduct, in light of the
procedures put in place by the government entity and the
relationships already existing between the public access channels and
198
the local community. Another strike against the regulation was that
it would “greatly increase the risk that certain categories of
programming (say, borderline offensive programs) [would] not
199
appear.” Though the plurality never specifically stated that its
analysis involved a consideration of the public access channels’
independent First Amendment rights, its use of a form of
200
intermediate scrutiny to analyze the government regulation and its
concern with preserving the public entity’s editorial freedom only
make sense if the local public broadcaster’s expressive acts—its
selection of which programs to air—were protected by the Free
201
Speech Clause.
The Court similarly implied that the speech acts of a public
broadcaster could be protected in FCC v. League of Women Voters of
202
California. In this case, a 5–4 majority invalidated a section of the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 that forbade public broadcasters
203
from expressing editorial opinions on the air. Though the Court
again did not specifically recognize that the First Amendment
protected public broadcasters’ speech, it characterized the prohibition
on editorializing as overly broad and a “substantial abridgment of
important journalistic freedoms which the First Amendment jealously
204
protects.” Although the stations restricted by the provision in
question were both publicly and privately owned—thus making it
possible to justify the decision based upon the free speech rights of

threatened use, could prevent the presentation of programming, that, though borderline, is not
‘patently offensive’ to its targeted audience”).
198. Id. at 766.
199. Id.
200. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 217–18 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citing Denver as a case in which “circumstances call[ed] for
heightened, but not ‘strict,’ scrutiny”).
201. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1448–49 (“[T]he result in Denver can be
explained only in light of the plurality’s full-bodied idea of editorial freedom exercised by the
local government agencies that controlled the local public channels. In other words, the local
government was acting as a speaker for purposes of the First Amendment.”).
202. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
203. Id. at 402.
204. Id.
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205

the private broadcasters and not the state-owned entities —League
of Women Voters represents another situation in which the Court has
flirted with the possibility of granting Free Speech Clause protection
to the editorial decisions of a government entity.
As the decisions in Denver and League of Women Voters, as well
as the dicta in American Library Ass’n, demonstrate, the Supreme
Court has at times expressed a willingness to treat the expressive
conduct of certain government institutions as protected by the First
206
Amendment. The limited contexts in which this right has been
contemplated—thus far, primarily broadcasting and library
management—lend support to the idea that Free Speech Clause
protection for state speech could be restricted on an institutionspecific basis. A second limiting factor on First Amendment
protection for government agencies’ editorial judgments that these
cases illustrate is the need for certain institutional safeguards, such as
clearly stated policies and a transparent decisionmaking process.
Thus, the second factor that courts should examine when determining
whether to afford speech acts of government agencies First
Amendment protection is the soundness of the internal structure of
the organization and the degree to which the expression conforms to
its procedural norms.
2. Mandating Procedural Fairness. In both Denver and League of
Women Voters, the Court emphasized the protections provided by the
structural framework of the public broadcasting organization whose
207
speech was at issue. Justice Souter’s dissent in American Library
205. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1444 (“Because the ban on editorializing in
[League of Women Voters] applied to privately owned public television as well as publicly
owned stations, the First Amendment right upheld was that of private companies not in court; it
was not the right of the in-court public advocate.” (footnote omitted)).
206. Other cases demonstrate this same willingness to consider government entities as First
Amendment rightsholders in similar contexts. For example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), the Court considered whether the government
infringed upon the free speech rights of a group of law schools that refused to allow military
recruiters on campus in protest of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Id. at 51. Without
differentiating between the public and private schools involved in the protest, the Court
determined that the schools’ First Amendment rights had not been violated. Id. at 61–65.
207. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 761–63 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (“Whether these locally accountable bodies prescreen programming,
promulgate rules for the use of public access channels, or are merely available to respond when
problems arise, the upshot is the same: There is a locally accountable body capable of
addressing the problem, should it arise, of patently offensive programming broadcast to
children . . . .”); League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 388–91 (“[T]o the extent that federal
financial support creates a risk that stations will lose their independence through the bewitching

MAHAFFEY IN PRINTER PROOF

1280

1/14/2011 1:04:21 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1239

Ass’n, which relied on CIPA’s conflict with internal policies
promulgated by the ALA in arguing that the provision should be
overturned, also demonstrated the Court’s interest in these
208
Given courts’ historical deference to
institutional safeguards.
decisions made by government agencies in accordance with their
stated purposes, it follows that an agency’s independent status and
the transparent pursuit of its goals would factor into a court’s analysis
of whether its speech should be protected under the First
Amendment. This requirement is similar to the first of Professor
Fagundes’s proposed criteria, which would take into account “the
extent to which . . . expression is congruent with the original purpose
for which it was created; falls within the ambit of its delegated or
original authority; or represents a subject matter over which the
209
speaker possesses distinctive expertise.”
A related consideration that would provide additional protection
for the primary speakers in the speech-selection realm and clarify
when another sovereign has encroached upon the protected
expression of a government agency is whether the agency has a stated
210
policy regarding its speech-selection methods. Formal selection
policies provide unbiased explanations to individuals whose speech
was not selected. They also provide a baseline account of selection
policies created by experts in the field, which can be contrasted with a
211
conflicting governmental policy in a First Amendment analysis.
Given that most, if not all, of the institutions to which this Note
proposes extending First Amendment protection already have these

power of governmental largesse, the elaborate structure established by the Public Broadcasting
Act already operates to insulate local stations from governmental interference.”).
208. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 239–41 (2003) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (outlining the openly stated policies of the ALA articulated in the Library Bill of
Rights, as well as its stance against labeling of books and restricted shelf policies).
209. Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1677.
210. This idea is adapted from Professor Gia Lee’s article advocating clear speech policies as
a way to justify judicial deference to state institutions in the face of individual employees’ First
Amendment claims. See generally Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government
Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691 (2009) (arguing in favor of a “free speech
conditional deference model,” which suggests that courts should apply reasonableness review to
regulations of the speech of government employees only if the government entity’s restriction of
speech is enforced pursuant to a clearly stated policy).
211. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 239–41 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing a comparison
of the ALA’s stated policies against censorship to the CIPA provision requiring Internet
filtering software to be installed on library computers and concluding that the CIPA provision is
not consistent with “the historical development of library practice”).
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212

kinds of institutional safeguards in place, it would be a simple
matter for a court to determine whether an agency has acted
according to its purpose, authority, expertise, and stated policies.
Further, if an agency has adhered to these guidelines and another,
more powerful state actor encroaches upon its discretion, then a court
should recognize the free speech claims of the agency against the
violating entity.
C. The Model in Practice
In practice, an agency would look to vindicate its First
Amendment rights when Congress or the president sought to regulate
its activities in a way that conflicted with its mission of promoting
discourse by independently selecting speech to broadcast or promote.
To demonstrate that a court should afford it rights under the Free
Speech Clause, the agency or organization would demonstrate (1)
that it possesses institutional characteristics that make its core
functions protective of free speech and (2) that the activity the
broader federal government seeks to control is speech activity. Thus,
under the second part of this rubric, the government’s attempt to
regulate the CPB’s broadcasting activities would trigger scrutiny,
whereas an attempt to regulate its internal accounting policies would
not.
If the organization’s activity was determined worthy of First
Amendment protection, the court would then apply the form of
213
heightened scrutiny used in the broadcasting context. Justice Breyer
suggested this level of scrutiny in his American Library Ass’n
214
concurrence,
and it appears apposite in situations involving
“competing constitutional interests” or “speech-related harm [that] is
215
potentially justified by unusually strong governmental interests.”
Thus, the court would balance “whether the harm to speech-related
interests is disproportionate in light of both the justifications and the
potential alternatives,” taking into account “the legitimacy of the
statute’s objective, the extent to which the statute will tend to achieve
212. See supra
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that objective, whether there are other, less restrictive ways of
achieving that objective, and ultimately whether the statute works
speech-related harm that, in relation to that objective, is out of
216
proportion.”
The dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens and Souter in
American Library Ass’n demonstrate how the proposed analysis
might function in a particular case. First, Justice Stevens’s opinion
examined the unique properties of a library—the institutional
characteristics that this Note argues should be the first consideration
217
when granting First Amendment rights to a government entity. He
then explained that the choice of whether to install Internet filtering
software is one of the library’s unique selection decisions and
concluded that “a library’s exercise of judgment with respect to its
218
collection is entitled to First Amendment protection.” Justice
Souter’s dissent, meanwhile, addressed the factors that would be
involved in a heightened scrutiny analysis by noting the ALA’s clearly
stated policies, promulgated by experts and designed to allow
libraries to function according to their stated purpose, and pointed
out the conflict between these policies and the provision challenged in
219
court. He thereby provided the information needed to convincingly
argue that the government’s stated interest in protecting minors may
not be compelling enough to undermine the library’s right to provide
information to the public and to abide by its independently derived
standards. Together, these two opinions demonstrate the workability
of the proposed model for granting certain government institutions
First Amendment rights and suggest that separating the speech of the
organization from its organic statute allows the federal regulation to
220
properly be analyzed as a restriction of protected speech.

216. Id. at 217–18.
217. Id. at 225–26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of the central purposes of a library is to
provide information for educational purposes . . . .”).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 239–41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 226–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “it . . . [is] clear that the First
Amendment protects libraries from being denied funds for refusing to comply with [a] . . . rule”
that restricts their editorial choices).
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CONCLUSION
The interaction of the Free Speech Clause with governmentfunded arts, library, and broadcast organizations is a complicated one.
On the one hand, to allow these institutions the freedom to function
as true supporters of cultural achievement, courts must afford them
the discretion to exclude certain speech activities based on content
and viewpoint, thereby avoiding cacophony and upholding the
selective nature of their organizations. On the other hand, there is a
patent discomfort with the idea that the federal government can
mandate any limitations it wishes on these organizations just because
it is merely refusing to fund speech, rather than extinguishing it. This
disquiet results from a shared understanding of these organizations as
providers of art, news, and literature that represent the diverse spirit
of the United States. The clear political lines along which debates
over this subject too often divide suggest that a transparent, neutral,
court-enforced standard might provide a solution that avoids
constantly subjecting these organizations to the push and pull of
partisan politics. This Note has suggested how such a framework
could be constructed, while preserving the delicate balance between
the competing free speech interests of the state as broadcaster,
librarian, and patron of the arts and those of the free speech actors
whose activities these organizations affect.

